Related Papers
Merger Control and Enterprise Competitiveness - Empirical Analysis and Policy Recommendations
2001 •
Johan Stennek
Working Papers
Mergers and Acquisitions Motives
2007 •
Jrisy Motis
European Business Organization Law Review
The Role of Efficiency under the EU Merger Regulation
2003 •
Gian Luca Zampa
Efficiency Tests in the Merger Control Regimes of the Baltic Countries: Myth or Reality?
Jurgita Malinauskaite
A dive into 'unknown' waters : a critical analysis of the EC merger control mechanism and policy and its application in the Baltic Countries
2006 •
Jurgita Malinauskaite
This study undertakes a comparative analysis of the approaches towards merger control regime taken at the EC and the national levels, namely the Baltic countries. The emergence and further development of competition law and policy (particularly merger control rules) in the unexplored Baltic countries represent a novelty of the work, as there are no comprehensive legal writings in this area. The comparative research revealed that the EC incorporates both a negative and a positive approach vis-a-vis merger control rules; after shifting towards a more economic based approach, the EC regulatory authorities have explicitly recognised possible pro-competitive effects of mergers on competition. Whereas, the situation differs in the Baltic countries: despite committing themselves to applying the EC competition policy, these countries employ a negative approach towards merger transactions by placing focus on finding `dominance' rather than stressing emphasis on a merger's effects on ...
QUANTIFYING THE SCOPE FOR EFFICIENCY DEFENSE IN MERGER CONTROL: THE WERDEN-FROEB-INDEX super
2008 •
Maarten Schinkel
This paper introduces the Werden-Froeb Index (WFI) to assist in evaluating merger-specific efficiencies in horizontal mergers. The index measures the weighted average reduction in marginal costs required to restore pre-merger equilibrium prices and quantities after the (full or partial) merger is consummated. The WFI is well defined, objective and robust, and it has relatively low information requirements. We propose to
Journal Of Competition Law & Economics
OUP accepted manuscript
2020 •
Celine Bonnet
In this article, we extend the literature on merger simulation models by incorporating its potential synergy gains into structural econometric analysis. We present an integrated approach. We estimate a structural demand and supply model dealing with two-part tariff contracts between manufacturers and retailers as in Bonnet and Dubois (2010). This model allows us to recover the marginal cost of each differentiated product. Then we estimate potential efficiency gains using the data envelopment analysis approach of Bogetoft and Wang (2005), and some assumptions about exogenous cost shifters. In the last step, we simulate the new price equilibrium post-merger by taking into account synergy gains, and derive price and welfare effects. We use a home scan data set of dairy dessert purchases in France, and show that synergy gains could offset the upward pressure on prices post. Moreover, in this market, the increase in industry profit due to the merger is more driven by its induced synergy ...
An Empirical Analysis of Mergers
2017 •
Celine Bonnet
In this article, we extend the literature on merger simulation models by incorporating its potential synergy gains into structural econometric analysis. We present a three-step integrated approach. We estimate a structural demand and supply model, as in Bonnet and Dubois (2010). This model allows us to recover the marginal cost of each differentiated product. Then we estimate potential efficiency gains using the Data Envelopment Analysis approach of Bogetoft and Wang (2005), and some assumptions about exogenous cost shifters. In the last step, we simulate the new price equilibrium post merger taking into account synergy gains, and derive price and welfare effects. We use a homescan dataset of dairy dessert purchases in France, and show that for two of the three mergers considered, synergy gains could offset the upward pressure on prices post. Some mergers could then be considered as not harmful for consumers.
Ioannis Kokkoris and Claudia Lemus (eds.) Research Handbook on the Law and Economics of Competition Enforcement (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2022)
Common Ownership and Merger Control Enforcement
2022 •
Anna Tzanaki
Common ownership fundamentally upsets the well-settled merger enforcement ecosystem. Not only it challenges basic principles informing merger policy such as the presumed profitability of mergers for the merging firms and the merger-specificity of potential efficiencies but also it works against implementing tools and presumptions in merger practice such as concentration indices for screening out unproblematic from potentially harmful mergers. The incremental effect of a merger taking place in an environment of common ownership may be either smaller or larger by comparison to a counterfactual with no common ownership. The sign and size of the merger effect will depend on the relative post-merger stakes of the common shareholders in the merging firms vis-à-vis any stakes in non-merging rivals in the same industry and on the specific financial structure of the merger deal. Accordingly, merger enforcement should shift towards more fact-specific analysis and antitrust authorities may want to consider developing guidelines.
